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Abstract 
This article provides guidance on interpreting and reporting Bayesian hypothesis tests, in order to 
aid their understanding. To use and report a Bayesian hypothesis test, predicted effect sizes must be 
specified. The paper will provide guidance in specifying effect sizes of interest (which also will be 
of relevance to those using frequentist statistics).  First, if a minimally interesting effect size can be 
specified, a null interval is defined as the effects smaller in magnitude than the minimally 
interesting effect.  Then the proportion of the posterior distribution that falls in the null interval 
indicates the plausibility of the null interval hypothesis. Second, if a rough scale of effect can be 
determined, a Bayes factor can indicate evidence for a model representing that scale of effect versus 
a model of H0. Both methods allow data to count against a theory that predicts a difference. By 
contrast, non-significance does not count against such a theory. Various examples are provided 
including the suitability of Bayesian analyses for demonstrating the absence of conscious perception 
under putative subliminal conditions, and its presence in supraliminal conditions.  
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 Hypothesis testing is an integral part of many disciplines. The details of how we have been 
testing hypotheses has come under criticism and indeed has been targeted as an explanation for why 
various disciplines now face a credibility crisis (e.g. Halsey, Curran-Everett, Vowler, & Drummond, 
2015). Using Bayesian hypothesis testing has been proposed as addressing some of the problems 
(e.g. Wagenmakers, Marsman, Jamil, Ly et al., 2018). Bayesian hypothesis testing will only address 
problems, of course, if understood by both the author of a paper and its readers. This article will 
provide brief guidance on interpreting and reporting Bayesian hypothesis tests, in order to aid their 
understanding. To use and report a Bayesian hypothesis test, predicted effect sizes must be 
specified. The paper will provide guidance in specifying effect sizes of interest (which also will be 
of relevance to those using frequentist statistics, because specifying effect sizes of interest is 
inferentially crucial for any statistical system). 
 Statistical inference can be divided into estimation and hypothesis testing (e.g. Jeffreys, 
1939). Estimation involves saying how big something is; for example, finding a mean and its 
standard error. Hypothesis testing involves comparing two or more hypotheses, typically the claim 
that there is no effect (H0) versus the claim that there is an effect of interest (H1).  Estimation and 
hypothesis testing complement each other. Given doubt about something's existence, it is useful to 
use Bayesian hypothesis testing to determine the strength of evidence that it exists. Given minimal 
credibility that something exists, it is reasonable to ask how big it is. Indeed, estimates are required 
for hypothesis testing to proceed. Thus, estimation for any effect deemed credible enough to 
research is always required. This paper will discuss Bayesian hypothesis testing to indicate what 
key problem it can solve, and then give guidelines on how to report the results. Although the point 
of the paper is to discuss Bayesian hypothesis testing, this is not to diminish estimation: It will be 
presumed that there will also always be accompanying estimates (e.g. means and standard errors). If 
estimates should always be provided, why test hypotheses? If one only used estimation, one would 
not be in a position to conclude that the data indicated that an effect did or did not exist (Haaf, Ly, & 
Wagenmakers, 2019). This paper is aimed at researchers for whom the existential claim of whether 
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or not something exists (i.e. a population numerical relationship exists) is relevant to their research. 
One has, for example, at least implicitly tested hypotheses when claiming that people performed at 
chance, that there was no interaction, or when leaving a previously considered variable out of a 
model. That is, scientists routinely wish to test hypotheses. 
 The typical non-Bayesian method of hypothesis testing is significance testing. Significance 
testing leads to the claim that an effect was or was not significant. Fisher (1935) pointed out that the 
null hypothesis is never established by a non-significant result. According to Fisher, we can 
disprove H0 by a significant result, but not establish it by a non-significant result. This asymmetry 
is unfortunate, because it means significance alone does not allow us to test theories that predict a 
difference:  a non-significant result does not count against such theories. Confidence intervals 
illustrate why not. The confidence interval is the set of population values we still accept as possible 
in the light of data. An equivalent way of saying a result is non-significant (where H0 is the claim of 
no effect) is to say zero (no difference) is in the confidence interval.  If zero is in the interval, zero is 
still possible -  but note so are all the other differences in the confidence interval. Any confidence 
interval indicates that many population effects are possible. So, given a non-significant result, there 
is no reason to accept specifically zero as the population value. Yet many researchers still 
groundlessly use non-significance to count against a theory that predicts a difference (e.g. Abelson, 
1995; Aczel, Palfi, Szollosi, Kovacs, et al. 2018; Dienes, 2016; Greenland, 2017). Drawing strong 
conclusions for baseless reasons must surely contribute to bad science. 
 Bayesian inference provides a solution (for other solutions see: Colling & Szűcs, 2018; 
Lakens, McLatchie, Isager, Scheel, et al.., 2018; for arguments in favour of the Bayesian solutions, 
see Dienes, 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). There are two overall Bayesian approaches for testing 
hypotheses that we will consider in turn: The relation of a posterior distribution to a null interval; 
and Bayes factors. 
 
The relation of a posterior distribution to a null interval. 
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Background 
In estimating an effect (e.g. a mean difference), one can start from prior information or 
constraints, represented by a prior distribution of the effect. For example, if it is known the 
population mean cannot be less than 0 or more than 1, although sample estimates can be (e.g. the 
meta-d’/d’ of Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, when Type I and II decisions are made on the same 
information), a uniform distribution [0, 1] (i.e. the claim that values between 0 and 1 are equally 
plausible using the dependent variable, and values outside these limits are not possible) can serve as 
a prior distribution that represents this constraint in a simple way. Such a uniform would 
appropriately ensure that the credibility interval did not extend into an impossible range. Or when 
estimating the number of hits and false alarms based on a small number of observations in a signal 
detection study, the estimated population numbers can be improved by vague priors (which can be 
implemented by adding a count to each cell, Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013, p. 545). Or when testing 
patients, and one has only a few observations, the variance of normal people may be used to 
improve the estimate of a patient’s variance (consider when it is known that patient variance is 
generally large, but based on two observations a patient seems to have small variance)1.  
 The prior distribution represents prior constraints. In Bayesian statistics, how the data are 
postulated to be distributed is represented by the “likelihood function”. When the prior distribution 
is combined with the data (as represented by the likelihood function), a posterior distribution is 
obtained, giving the probability density of different effects taking into account both the data and 
prior constraints (for details on how this works see Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2018).  If one wished to 
build in minimal prior constraints, the prior can be a uniform approximating [-∞, +∞]  (cf. Gelman, 
 
1 In conventional statistics one can either use the variance from the patient as it is; or, one could use a pooled 
variance from the patient and from normals, given the assumption that the variances were the same. In the Bayesian 
case one need not make such strong assumptions, either way. For example, one could use a prior worth one 
observation from the normal’s data. In summing the squared differences for the patient add in the normals’ variance 
as one squared difference, contributing one degree of freedom, to calculating the patient variance. This weak prior 
(simple to implement with no special programs) may make the estimation of the patient variance more accurate 
with a small number of observations, yet would be appropriately swamped by real patient data as more came in. A 
computationally more complex and subtle method would be Bayesian hierarchical modelling. 
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Simpson, & Betancourt, 2017, for caution against automatically using a uniform distribution). Then 
the posterior reflects the data (constrained only by how their distribution is modelled in the 
likelihood function).   
 A parameter is a population value we wish to make claims about, for example a population 
mean difference. If a broad uniform prior is used for a parameter (e.g. a mean difference with 
known variance), and the likelihood function is a normal distribution, the posterior will be a normal 
distribution the same as the (frequentist) sampling distribution of the mean difference. With an 
unknown variance and some standard assumptions about the prior on the variance, the posterior 
distribution for the mean difference will again be the same as the sampling distribution of the mean 
difference. Thus, under these conditions, the Bayesian 95% credibility interval will be numerically 
the same as the 95% confidence interval.  For more details on the process of Bayesian estimation in 
more interesting ways (i.e. with results that can usefully differ from frequentist methods) see 
Gelman, Carlin, Stern, Dunson, et al. (2013), Greenland (2006, 2007), Kruschke (2014), McElreath 
(2016); for an accessible introduction to Bayesian estimation, see Wagenmakers et al. (2018). For 
brief guidance on the details of computing Bayesian estimates see Krushcke (2013) v,an 
Ravenzwaaij, Cassey, and Brown  (2018). The only further comments this article will make about 
estimation is in interpreting the posterior distribution, in order to show how one may test 
hypotheses.  
 The posterior distribution (of, say, a mean difference) enables one to calculate the 
probability of the mean difference lying between any two possible values. The probability of the 
population mean difference lying between the limits -3  and +5 units is the area under the curve of 
the posterior distribution between -3  and + 5 (i.e. the black area in Figure 1a).  As the two limits 
come closer together (Figure 1b) the area under the curve becomes smaller (compare black areas of 
1a to 1b). As the lower limit becomes the same as the upper limit, the area goes to zero. That is, the 
probability of any specific population value is zero, by this representation. (The area under a single 
point on the curve is just a vertical line, so the area is zero.) 
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(a)        (b) 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 1 
Area under the curve 
The probability that the value is between two limits is the area under a probability density curve 
between those limits (the black area). Thus, as the limits come closer together (from (a) to (b)), the 
area shrinks, becoming zero for the probability of the value being precisely one value (e.g. precisely 
2.1001). 
 
 
 Using the standard representations of a posterior distribution, for example a normal 
distribution or a t distribution, the probability of any particular population effect (such as zero, or no 
effect) is exactly zero; the area under that point is zero. Thus, whether or not the H0 value (no 
effect) is inside or outside a 95% credibility interval is irrelevant to that value’s probability: There is 
always 100% certainty that there is some population effect (according to the posterior distribution, 
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no matter its shape or location). It is thus wrong to use the rule of whether or not zero is in a 
credibility interval to draw any conclusions about whether or not there is an effect. 
 How then can one draw inferences about whether or not there is an effect? There are two 
solutions. The first is to use a null interval hypothesis (a hypothesis that the population value lies 
between two limits, such as -0.1 and +0.1 units) rather than a point null hypothesis (a hypothesis 
that the population value is exactly one value, such as 0 units). If H0 defines an interval, then that 
interval can have a probability using standard posterior distributions; it is the proportion of the 
posterior distribution in that interval (that is, it is the area under the posterior curve between the 
limits defining the interval) (Greenwald, 1975; also see Kruschke, 2014).  The second solution is to 
mathematically assign a probability to a point value, in order to represent the belief that the point 
could in fact be a good approximation to the truth - the option followed by Jeffreys (1939) in 
developing Bayes factors. We will first consider using a null interval. 
 
Crucial practical considerations 
In defining a null interval, the problem is to define a minimally interesting effect size, m, a 
magnitude below which the effect is too small to be relevant for theory or practice. The null 
hypothesis is then that the true population effect size is in the null interval [-m, +m]. No effect in 
that interval is privileged as more important than the others; if there is evidence for H0, there is 
evidence for the claim that the true effect is somewhere in that interval (i.e. it is not evidence that 
the effect is precisely zero). Kruschke (2014, 2018) suggests calculating a 95% CI (Credibility 
Interval, or Highest Density Interval, HDI, as it can also be called, given standard ways of 
calculating CIs) and using the rule: If the 95% CI is completely inside the null interval, accept H0; 
if completely outside the null interval, reject H0; otherwise suspend judgment.  This would largely 
correspond in practice to Greenwald’s (1975) subtler rule of determining if 95% of the posterior 
distribution is inside or outside the null interval. In following such a rule, two choices are made: 
One is the amount of evidence or plausibility one takes as good enough, which is determined by 
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whether one uses a 95% CI, a 90% CI etc. Kruschke recommends a 95% CI; this can be a 
convention for standard situations. In frequentist equivalence testing, in effect a 90% confidence 
interval is recommended (Lakens, Scheel, & Isager, 2018). Note that the choice of the x% used for 
the CI does not reflect any step change in the information a posterior distribution provides; the 
choice is just to allow decision making. The other choice is in specifying the predictions of one’s 
theory: What counts as a minimally interesting effect size (Kruschke, 2018)? 
 Raw effect effect sizes are usually what are of theoretical or practical relevance. For 
example, if considering an intervention to lose weight, any effect less than 0.5 kg over one month 
might be regarded as too small to be of clinical interest. A raw effect size is an effect in a unit of 
measurement, as in this case, kg. A person interested in losing weight is not interested in how much 
noise is in the scales measuring them (the noise affects standardized effect sizes); just in the kg’s 
lost over a period of time (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2008). A standardized effect size (such as Cohen’s 
d , Pearson’s r, or a standardized regression coefficient) depends on how noisy the measuring 
apparatus is: How many questions in a questionnaire, how many trials on a cognitive task, and so 
on. Having ten times as many trials changes Cohen’s d (by participants) by about a factor of 3 (i.e. 
square root 10). Putting covariates and other factors in an analysis may change standardized effect 
sizes by reducing noise. So the first point is that one cannot pluck from the air an effect size of, for 
example, Cohen’s d = 0.1, and say that is the minimally interesting effect size for all effects. It is a 
scientific matter what the minimally interesting effect is, and so there can be no general statistical 
solution. Any general statistical assumption about what a minimally interesting effect size is must 
be false in an indefinite number of scientific cases. 
 Because the inference that there is no effect depends crucially on the possible size of the 
effect, that size should be specified for objective reasons: That is, the numerical value for the effect 
should come from a public place one can point to (for example, data),  so that other people can 
criticize the reason for choosing that value.  The reasons should relate back to the theoretical or 
practical context. Back engineering a minimal interesting effect size from the number of 
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participants used in past studies is not informative, as it presumes the past studies determined their 
number of participants based on good reasons for detecting a certain a minimally interesting effect 
size. The problem is only pushed back. A committee deciding on a smallest effect of interest is 
useful in so far as the committee gives its reasons so they can be criticized and the estimate 
improved.  Thus, black boxes like committees, or an expert’s opinion, also push back the problem 
of what would constitute a good reason. Once a number has been chosen, ideally from a public 
place, judgment is needed at that point to indicate that the reasons are provisionally good enough (a 
judgment that must apply to every aspect of a statistical model, whether frequentist or Bayesian, or 
anything else). We now go through some heuristics for obtaining a minimally interesting effect size. 
 
i) The end user heuristic: The judgment of an end user. In applied research what matters is 
whether the outcome is good enough for the end user.  There have been a number of examples of 
the judgment of end users defining minimally interesting effect sizes. Taking the end users of a 
depression treatment to include the treating psychiatrists, Leucht et al. (2013) found a clinician's 
impression of ‘no change’ corresponded to a Hamilton rating scale change of 3 units, and an 
impression of ‘minimally improved’ to 7 units; this has motivated the use of 3 units and smaller on 
the Hamilton as defining an area of clinical irrelevance (Moncrief & Kirsch, 2015). Leucht et al. 
(2006) applied a similar methodology to schizophrenia.  Taking the end users of a depression 
treatment to be the patients, Button et al. (2015) analysed studies that had asked depressed patients 
if they felt the ‘same’, ‘better’ or ‘worse’ after treatment. They estimated that the Beck Depression 
Inventory reduced by 17% as a criterion for patients moving from a “same” to a “better” response. 
Thus, 17% on the Beck Depression Inventory can also be taken as a minimal clinically relevant 
effect size for an intervention aimed at treating depression. 
 The end user can also judge if a change in pain is noticeable or meaningful. Dworkin et al. 
(2008) found that reductions in pain of approximately 10-20% were noticeable, and reductions of 
approximately 40% were judged as meaningful.  Kelly (2001) found that the smallest change 
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associated with the judgment of feeling “a little better” or “a little worse” was 12 mm on a 100-mm 
visual analogue scale of pain intensity (this is very similar to the 10-20% difference obtained by 
Dworkin et al. as noticeable).  
 Anvari and Lakens (2019) applied the end user heuristic to affect as measured by the widely 
used Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants 
rated affect on both Wednesday and Friday (using a Likert scale going from 1 = “very slightly or not 
at all”, to 5 = “extremely”). On Friday they were also asked to indicate if their affect had changed a 
little, a lot, or not at all. When people indicated their affect had changed “a little”, the average 
change in Likert units was 0.3 scale points.  Thus an intervention to lift mood might be regarded as 
effective only if it could lift mood by an amount regarded as noticeable, i.e. by more than 0.3 Likert 
units on the PANAS. This method could in principle be generalized to different judgments (for 
example, how mindful the person feels). 
 Sometimes a theory may indicate who a relevant end user is. Accordingly, Lakens, Scheel, 
and Isager (2018) suggest that a just noticeable difference may be an appropriate minimally 
interesting effect size in some contexts. For example, if women's faces become redder during the 
fertile phase, that result does not support an evolutionary signalling function of facial redness if the 
change in redness is below the just noticeable difference (jnd) for male observers. Thus, a one jnd 
may be a minimally interesting effect size. In this case, one may be able to refine the minimally 
interesting effect size by determining the degree of change in facial redness that was just enough to 
prompt men to act in an appropriate way (thereby using the calibration heuristic below), which may 
be more than one jnd. 
 
ii) Calibration.  Dienes (2014; supplemental data- Appendix 1, example 2) showed how one 
measure, for which we do not have a relevant interesting effect size, can be regressed against 
another, for which we do, in order to calibrate the former. For example, previous research has 
shown a cognitive task is related to depression.  A study plans to investigate whether performance 
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on the task is changed by a treatment for depression, rTMS. Task performance may be a reaction 
time difference measured in milliseconds. A minimally interesting effect size may be obtained by a 
norming study in which the task is regressed against the Hamilton; the norming study may be past 
research or a new study. Then find what change in task performance is predicted by a 7 unit change 
in the Hamilton (taking 7 units as a minimally interesting effect). In this example, one also needs to 
consider the rTMS regime: Only if it were the same dose as a patient would receive in actual 
treatment would one take 7 units on the Hamilton as the calibrating amount. If the rTMS dose were 
half as strong (e.g. applied for half as many occasions), the simplest approach would be halve the 
expected effect, and thus use 3.5 units on the Hamilton as the minimally interesting effect size.  
 
iii) Checking the roughly smallest plausible value is still theoretically relevant. For conceptual 
and direct replications using same dependent variable, where there have been past studies, one can 
look at the lower limit of 95% CI of the raw effect (cf. Perugini, Gallucci, & Costantini, 2014), and 
check if it is it still theoretically or practically interesting. If so, this value, for which the population 
effect is very probably greater (with probability 97.5%) , could be conventionally taken as a 
smallest interesting effect which is just plausible. For example, consider a study investigating 
whether a four-week mindfulness of walking intervention changes mindfulness on a 1-5 Likert 
scale. If past research using a four-week mindfulness of breathing intervention (i.e. a slightly 
different procedure) changes rated mindfulness on a 1-5 Likert scale by 0.5 units, with a lower limit 
of the 95% CI of 0.3 units, one can judge if 0.3 units is still meaningful. Admittedly this may be 
difficult, and the heuristic therefore unhelpful; but often the judgment that an effect is meaningful is 
easy if the effect is sufficiently large. For example, previous shorter two-week mindfulness 
interventions may have produced changes of 0.2 units in mindfulness, yet had other positive 
consequences. We just have to judge that 0.3 is interesting, not that it is only just interesting. If 0.3 
units is interesting, it can be taken as the minimally interesting effect size. 
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 The smaller the minimally interesting effect, m, (decided by any of the above methods) the 
easier to obtain a 95% CI outside the null interval [-m, +m]; but the harder to obtain a 95% CI 
inside the null interval. If the theory predicts a difference, a test of the theory is only severe if the 
probability of obtaining a 95% CI in the null interval is high. Thus, the null interval must be wide 
enough to allow severe testing (cf. Mayo, 2018; Popper, 1963). For example, in planning a study 
one may work out a sample size such that if the null region hypothesis were true, with the number 
of participants used, at least 80% of the time (or 90% etc) the 95% CI would fall within the null 
region. (Such planning has no effect on the conclusions reached when the data are in, but it is useful 
for working out what number of participants may be needed to test a theory properly.)  
 These methods cover many cases but far from all.  Objective reasons for a minimally 
interesting effect can be hard to come by; but unless such reasons exist, the analysis does not 
connect to the theory. In the absence of objective reasons for a minimally interesting effect size, or 
if the minimally interesting effect size is unacceptably small for severe testing, one can consider if 
Bayes factors can be motivated for the analysis. 
 
Writing up  
For the APA guidelines on reporting Bayesian estimation, see Appelbaum, Cooper, Kline, 
Mayo-Wilson et al. (2018, p. 20); and for detailed advice on reporting Bayesian estimation see 
Depaoli and van de Schoot (2017). For the sake of argument, I will presume that a uniform prior 
was used, and the 95% credibility interval is numerically the same or very similar as the 95% 
confidence interval, in order to focus on hypothesis testing, and show how easily it may be done 
without complicated software, but that care is needed in considering the null region.  
 Always indicate what prior was used, and the form of the likelihood function. Give the mean 
and standard error of the estimate (i.e. mean and standard deviation of the posterior distribution, or 
other measure of central tendency and spread). It may be useful to give the 95% CI. Specify the 
minimal interesting effect size making clear what the reasons are for that value so the reader can 
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easily evaluate the reasons. Finally, indicate the relation between the posterior distribution and the 
null interval, for example whether the 95% CI falls within or without the null interval (Kruschke, 
2014). A Robustness Region, RR, can also be provided. The Robustness Region is the set of 
possible minimally interesting effect sizes that lead to the same conclusion (see the next example). 
 Here is an example: “The minimally interesting effect size in affect was derived from Anvari 
and Lakens (2019), who found a difference of about 0.3 units was noticeable as a small change in 
affect on PANAS. Thus, the null interval was defined as [-0.3, +0.3 Likert units]. For all tests a  
Robustness Region is given, notated as RR [min, max], namely the set of possible minimally 
interesting effect sizes that lead to the same conclusion using the decision rules provided by 
Kruschke (2018), described earlier. First, the compassion meditation group was compared with the 
active control group (indifference meditation). For positive affect as measured by the PANAS, the 
mean for the compassion group was 3.4 (SE = 0.2) Likert units, and the mean for the control group 
was 2.6 (SE = 0.2) Likert units. A uniform prior was assumed on the difference score, with a t-
distribution likelihood, so the 95% confidence interval was numerically the same as a Bayesian 
95% credibility interval. The difference was 0.80 (SE = 0.35) Likert units, 95% CI [0.1, 1.5 Likert 
units].  The 95% CI spans both interesting values (i.e. > 0.3 units) and null interval values, so the 
null interval hypothesis cannot be rejected, RR [0.1, 1.5 Likert units]. No conclusion as yet follows 
about the clinical effectiveness of compassion meditation compared to the active control. Notice the 
Robustness Region includes values rather different than 0.3 in either direction, so the conclusion is 
robust. The robustness in this case is reassuring because Anvari and Lakens (2018) estimated 
noticeable changes in a rather different context, and of course with some noise (for positive affect in 
their study, a judgment of “little changed” had a mean change in PANAS of 0.27, SE = 0.04 Likert 
units).” 
  
Bayes factors 
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Background 
A Bayes factor compares how probable the data are on one model (e.g.  H1) compared to 
another model (e.g. H0), and thus provides the strength of evidence for the one model rather than 
the other (see Dienes 2014; Etz, Haaf, Rouder, & Vandekerckhove, 2018, for introductions to Bayes 
factors). The Bayes factor reflects the principle that data most supports the theory that best predicts 
it (Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016). The models specify how probable different population effects 
are. We are free, for example, to say H0 predicts just one population effect, no effect. Thus, no 
minimal interesting effect need be specified (though it could be; Morey & Rouder, 2011; Palfi & 
Dienes, 2019a). Because the evidence for one model rather than another depends on what the 
models are, the model of H1 should reflect the theory being tested (just as the minimally interesting 
effect size needed to reflect theory). For guidance on easily computing Bayes factors using an 
online calculator, see Dienes (2014).  Conventions have also been suggested for the meaning of 
different values of the Bayes factor. Lee and Wagenmakers (2013) suggest treating greater than 3 as 
moderate evidence for H1 rather than H0, and, by symmetry, less than 1/3 as moderate evidence for 
H0 rather than H1; greater than 10 as strong evidence for H1 rather than H0, and less than 1/10 as 
strong evidence for H0 rather than H1.  For journals that use a 5% significance level, a convention 
of 3 (and therefore 1/3) would be suitable for a Bayes factor to reflect about the amount of evidence 
shown by p < .05 when evidence favours an H1 over H0, though there is no monotonic relation 
between Bayes factors and p values (Lindley, 1957). Further, Bayes factors are continuous measures 
of evidence; thresholds are convenient when decisions are made but such thresholds do not reflect 
any step changes in the evidential value of a Bayes factor. 
 
Crucial practical considerations 
The model of H0 assumed by most Bayes factor calculators is that only one value (e.g. zero) 
is possible as the value of the population parameter (Dienes, 2008; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey 
et al., 2009; van Doorn, van den Bergh, Bohm, Dablander, et al., 2019). Assuming a point H0 is 
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consistent with significance testing. What the typical Bayes factor requires that is new for people 
who are used to significance testing is a model of H1 (often called a prior), i.e. a representation of 
what the theory predicts.  The model of H1 is a probability density function over different possible 
population effects (i.e. it represents how plausible different population effects are, given the theory). 
This may take any form the researcher can argue best represents theory in a simple way. This prior 
serves a different purpose from that used in estimation and therefore will rarely be the same. The 
prior distribution used in estimation has the purpose of allowing the most accurate estimate of 
parameters. The purpose of the model of H1 is to represent the predictions of a theory. If one used 
the model of H1 as a prior distribution for estimation, the estimates would be pulled towards the 
predictions of the theory, and it would become harder to have outcomes count against the theory.  
The test would not be severe (it would be hard to show the theory false when it was false). The 
function of the model of H1 is not to represent what the data say; it is represent what the theory says 
so that it may clash with the data if the theory were wrong. Thus, to avoid confusion, I do not call 
the model of H1 a prior2. 
 A typical model of H1 is a normal (or Cauchy) distribution centred on zero, or such a 
distribution with the half below zero removed, as illustrated in Figure 2a. The half-normal 
distribution represents a theory making a directional prediction (where by convention the theory-
predicted direction is represented as positive). It represents in a simple way that smaller effects are 
more likely than larger effects. One may justify this assumption by noting that published effects 
often over-estimate true effects (e.g. Open Science Collaboration, 2015), so if the predicted scale of 
effect is derived from published studies, smaller effects would be more plausible than larger ones. 
 
2 A third referent of the term prior is the prior strength of belief in H1 vs H0. Not distinguishing these three referents 
(estimation prior, model of H1, prior odds of H1 vs H0) can lead to misplaced criticisms of Bayes factors,. For 
example, consider the argument that as how much one believes in subliminal perception is a subjective matter, 
Bayes factors are too subjective. But the model of H1 is a specification of what size effects are predicted by a 
hypothesis of subliminal perception, not an indication of how much one believes in that theory. (The prior belief in 
a theory can be relevant to scientific inference, for example when scientists hold very diverse judgments of 
plausibility, a study may plan for a more evidential Bayes factor than would otherwise be typical. But that is a 
different matter than how a Bayes factor is calculated.) Or consider the argument: Because the Bayes factor is 
sensitive to the prior (i.e. the model of H1, what predictions a theory makes), but the estimated mean is largely 
unchanged by variations in a vague prior, Bayes factors are a bit erratic, and we should just estimate. But of course, 
evidence for a theory should depend on what predictions it makes (Jeffreys, 1939). 
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Indeed, even when following up one’s own unpublished work, one may be especially drawn to 
effects that have been over-estimated (Albers & Lakens, 2018; Dienes, 2017). The standard 
deviation of the half-normal (or normal) distribution represents the scale of effect postulated to 
exist. The task is to specify the scale in a way relevant to one’s theory.  One may do this in two 
ways. Either one specifies with reasons the sort of scale that characterizes the population effect, and 
the standard deviation is set to this number.  Or one might have reasons for specifying the rough 
maximum population effect, then one sets the standard deviation to half the maximum (on the 
convention that a rough maximum for a normal distribution is two standard deviations out)3. If there 
were reasons for setting a maximum, and for values between zero and that maximum to all be 
roughly equally plausible, a uniform distribution can be used, as in Figure 2(b). 
  
 
  
(a)       
 (b) 
Figure 2  
Possible models of H1 
Two distributions that are often used as models of H1. The y axis is the plausibility of the effect 
given the theory; and x axis is the population effect size. (a) A half-normal distribution, which 
typically has a mode at zero (no effect), and thus requires setting only the standard deviation to the 
 
3 A Cauchy (or half-Cauchy distribution) can also be used; the Cauchy is a bell shaped distribution like the normal 
distribution but with thicker tails. It is useful when the rough maximum value expected is about 7-10 times the 
rough scale expected.  
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scale of effect size predicted. (b) A uniform distribution, which typically has the lower limit set to 
zero (no effect), and thus requires setting only the maximum. 
 
 The evidence for a theory depends on what sort of effect it predicts. One might think that the 
data itself gives the best estimate of the sort of effect that could be expected in the precise context 
used. However, if the effect size obtained is used to determine the effect size the theory predicts (by 
being used as the standard deviation of a half-normal distribution, for example), the obtained effect 
has been double counted: once to make a prediction; and, second, to test that prediction. Double 
counting is not legitimate in Bayes factors (Lindley, 1991).  An indication of the problem of double 
counting is that such a test would not be severe (double counting makes it hard to find the theory 
wrong). Further, when double counting, the theory does no work in making the prediction.  We now 
go through some heuristics for obtaining a relevant effect size for scaling predictions of a theory. 
 
(i) Direct replication.  In attempting to replicate a study, the effect found in the original study can 
be used as, for example, the standard deviation of a half-normal distribution for the model of H1 for 
the replication attempt (see e.g. Dienes & McLatchie, 2018, for worked examples).  Ly, Etz, 
Marsman, and Wagenmakers (2019) present a related method. The theory tested is that implied by 
any empirical paper: That the methods of the original study (as given in the Methods section) 
describe a procedure for obtaining the sort of effect obtained (as reported in the Results section). 
 In the absence of a previous study, it might be thought that the same logic could be 
employed with a single study, by taking a random sample from it to act as an “original” estimate 
(e.g. O’Hagan, 1995). That is, use a proportion of the data (e.g. √N) to estimate the effect for 
modelling H1; then the rest of data to test H1 against H0. One could take many such samples, and 
average the (log) Bayes factors. This procedure may seem tempting as it removes all need to specify 
what a theory predicts.  But that temptation shows the problem: There is no substantial theory being 
tested (Morey, Homer, & Proulx, 2018). And if there is no theory, and thus no independent 
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expectation of the effect size should an effect exist, there is no motivation to test a particular H1 
versus H0. Without a clearly motivated model of H1, it may be appropriate to simply estimate 
parameter values. The difference from a replication of a previous study is that in choosing to 
replicate a study, the original study is thereby taken as scientifically interesting.  Thus, the theory 
that the method reported produces the sort of effect reported is an interesting theory to test. 
 
(ii) Conceptual replication.  A study may be a conceptual replication of an original study.  In this 
case, one may often take the effect from the original study as the scaling factor, just as in the case of 
the direct replication. The theory being tested is that the phenomena studied in both experiments 
belong to the same class. 
 For example, imagine that a study shows a subliminal priming effect using back masking on 
a reduced contrast image (e.g. Armstrong & Dienes, 2014), where participants chose a primed 
option by an amount 5% above a chance baseline,  SE = 1.5%, N = 35, p< .05.  The procedure is 
repeated but this time using gaze contingent crowding (Faivre, Berthet, & Kouider, 2012), in this 
case displaying the prime for about the same time as the original study. The priming effect is now 
1% ,SE  = 2%, N = 35 (imaginary data).  Is there evidence for any subliminal perception using the 
new method? The outcome is non-significant (t = 0.5), but non-significance in itself does not mean 
anything. In the absence of a theory indicating why back masking should give a bigger or smaller 
effect, an approximate scale of effect is provided by the original study. Thus H1 could be modelled 
as a half-normal distribution with a standard deviation of 5%. Using the Dienes (2008) calculator, 
the Bayes factor is 0.564. The value is quite close to 1; the non-significant result in this case is non-
evidential. Thus, nothing follows about whether or not there was subliminal perception with gaze 
contingent crowding for these stimuli. More data are needed.5 
 
4 In the Dienes (2008) calculator ( http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm), enter 
the “sample mean” as 1, the “sample standard error” as  2, say “no” to Uniform, enter 0 for the mean for the 
normal, 5 for the SD, and 1 for the tails (i.e. making it half-normal). 
5 A default Bayes factor on the gaze contingent crowding results (a “JZS” Bayes factor with scale factor  = 0.7;  
http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor) is 0.20, i.e. moderate evidence for H0. However, this assumes a default scale 
factor of Cohen’s dz of 0.70; in the original experiment, Cohen’s dz was 0.08. While the default model of H1 
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(iii) Basic effect heuristic.  The basic effect heuristic is to find basic effect and use that as estimate 
of scale of effect for intervention aimed at changing that effect. When investigating whether an 
intervention moderates an effect, the size of the basic effect itself may provide a scale appropriate 
for expecting how much the effect could be altered:  A two-second effect may be modulated by a 
greater amount than a 50 ms-effect. Dienes, Baddeley and Jansari (2012) were interested in how 
much mood may change the amount of implicit learning.  They used a new implicit learning 
paradigm, so there was no prior information relevant to that particular paradigm about expected 
effect sizes. Dienes et al. ran a pilot to measure only the amount of learning, without any mood 
manipulation. Then in the main experiment looking at the effect of mood on learning, the amount of 
learning found in the pilot was used to scale expectations of effects of mood (by being entered as 
the standard deviation in a half-normal distribution for the H1 modelling mood effects).  See also 
Ziori and Dienes (2015) for use of the basic effect heuristic. In these cases, the main theory tested 
was supplemented by the auxiliary hypothesis that an intervention will have an effect somewhere 
between 0 and twice the basic effect, with smaller effects being more likely.  
 
(iv) Calibration with other data.  Dienes (2014; supplemental data- Appendix 1, example 2 
looking at meta-cognition) showed how one measure, for which we do not have a relevant 
interesting effect size, can be regressed against another, for which we do, in order to calibrate the 
former. For example, Dienes (2015) describes how calibration can be used for testing whether 
knowledge is unconscious. A common schema for establishing subliminal perception by an 
objective threshold is: “Priming = X%, p < .05; identification = Y%, p > .05.  Therefore there was 
subliminal perception.”  Such reasoning depends on asserting the null hypothesis for identification 
of the stimulus. But non-significance is not grounds for asserting H0. And obtaining a minimally 
interesting effect size for identification is difficult. But there is a crucial empirical question that can 
 
produces an answer (0.20) not far from the informed model of H1 in the text (0.56), there is a reason for preferring 
the latter; namely, it is informed by the relevant scientific context. 
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be answered that allows Bayes factors to be used: What level of identification would be expected 
for the amount of priming obtained, if the knowledge were conscious? 
 Dienes (2015) recommended running a norming study in which the perception was 
conscious; for example, under conditions where the participants say they saw the stimulus (with 
some degree of clarity or confidence). If the level of priming was about that observed in the 
putatively subliminal case, then the level of identification in the conscious study indicates the rough 
level of identification expected in the putative subliminal study, if the perception were actually 
conscious. But it is unlikely the levels of priming would be the same. In that case, on a graph of 
identification performance against priming performance, plot the means of the conscious condition 
as a point. The theory being tested is that there is only one perceptual knowledge base underlying 
performance on identification and priming (e.g. conscious perception). So as identification goes to 
zero (or whatever is the level of chance performance), so does priming, on this theory. So draw a 
line from the plotted point to (0,0) (see Figure 3). Now read off from the line, given the level of 
priming in the putative subliminal study, what level of identification would be expected, if there 
were only conscious perception6 (see Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Pratte, 2007. for another 
Bayesian approach to subliminal perception) 
 
 
 
6 Additional assumptions include (a) the relation is linear with the dependent variables used; so introducing a level of 
conscious perception that is not too  high is useful for approximating this assumption; and (b) identification 
measures uniquely conscious perception, which on many theories of consciousness would be false (Dienes & Seth, 
2010). 
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Figure 3 
Calibrating the predicted level of identification against priming 
In order to test whether or not perception is conscious in a putatively subliminal condition, one 
needs to know what level of conscious perception would explain the priming in the subliminal 
condition. Run a conscious condition and plot (conscious mean identification, conscious priming), 
the circle in the figure. Draw a line from there to (chance, chance). From the level of (putatively) 
unconscious priming, read off the expected level of identification, E.  Use a Bayes factor to test the 
identification of people in the subliminal condition by modelling H1 as a half-normal distribution 
with standard deviation  = E. 
 
 When using a past published study as the norming study, consider how performance is 
tested. For example, imagine a study by Lee finds evidence for priming, but not for conscious 
knowledge on a recognition test (e.g. Cohen’s dz = 0.16,  t(19) = 0.56). You find a study by Smyth 
using the same paradigm with about the same level of priming, and it did find evidence for 
conscious knowledge on a recognition test (dz= 0.6,  t(39) = 3.68). Using the Rouder et al. (2009) 
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Bayes factor, scaled in Cohens dz7, the Bayes factor is 0.30, moderate evidence for H0, i.e. for no 
conscious perception.  That sounds as if implicit processing has been shown in the Lee study. But 
say Lee used only one trial for the recognition test achieving 58% accuracy, and Smyth used 48 
trials, achieving 60% accuracy.  Population Cohen’s dz depends on the number of trials; thus, using 
Smyth’s Cohen’s dz as the expected effect size for the Lee study would be incorrect. One could 
adjust the expected Cohen’s dz according to number of trials. But if one used raw units, such as 
percentage correct, the second study’s effect size could be directly used as the predicted effect for 
the first (ceteris paribus), without assuming equivalent standard deviations between the studies; in 
this case, leading to a Bayes factor close to 1 as the obtained effect, 58%, is close to the scale of 
effect predicted, 60%, but with a large standard error (see Dienes, 2017). Using raw effect sizes as 
the basis for predictions motivates researchers to reduce noise in measurement; uncritical use of 
standardized effect sizes can motivate noisy measures when one wants to obtain evidence for H0 
(especially if using a default Bayes factor, i.e. one with a fixed scale factor regardless of context). 
 
(v) Heuristics for when there are no relevant prior studies. Dienes (2019) presents heuristics that 
can be used when there is not another study to inform expectations, different heuristics that can be 
used for mean differences, ANOVA, regression or mediation. An example for testing differences is 
the room-to-move heuristic: If a theory predicts that A will be smaller than B, then if B is above 
chance by an amount r, then A has to be between chance and r; r is the room to move.  Dienes 
(2015) applies this heuristic in a couple of cases. For example, meta-d’ cannot be larger than Type I 
d’ (when Type II and Type I decisions are made on the same information); thus, Type I d’ can be set 
as a maximum in modelling H1 for meta-d’ (for an application in implicit cognition see Leganes-
Fonteneau, Nikolaou, Scott, & Duka, 2019). Another example is using the Perceptual Awareness 
Scale (PAS) of Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004). The scale has four levels from PAS1 to PAS4, of 
increasing clarity of conscious visual experience. Given the theory that increasing conscious clarity 
 
7 http://pcl.missouri.edu/bf-one-sample 
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is associated with increasing ability to discriminate (a theory corroborated by the numerous 
experiments that have since used PAS), the discrimination shown at one level of PAS can be set as 
the maximum that could be achieved at the level just below. 
 
 In planning a study one can work out how many participants would probably be needed to 
achieve given Bayes factor thresholds, assuming a model of H1 (with a scale factor determined by 
any of the above methods).  Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers,  Zehetleitner, and Perugini (2017) and  
Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers (2018) describe how to conduct simulations to achieve desired 
probabilities. Although these probabilities bear a similarity to power calculations in frequentist 
statistics, there are key differences. Unlike the role of power in significance testing, the probabilities 
play no role in final inference when it comes to Bayes factors, because the Bayes factor itself 
indicates the evidence for H1 over H0. Further, in setting up a model of H1, the scale factor is the 
scale of effect predicted, not the minimally interesting effect size. For frequentist power, one should 
use the minimal interesting effect size to calculate power. The role of working out a required likely 
number of participants is purely pragmatic, to consider if one has the resources to severely test a 
theory. A very quick way of calculating an approximate likely number of participants, which 
involves no simulations, is provided by Palfi and Dienes (2019b, version 3, Table 1). One can use as 
a stopping rule to stop when a certain threshold for the Bayes factor has been reached (e.g. “greater 
than 6 or less than 1/6”). When one specifies a model of H1, the Bayes factor is the evidence for 
that H1 over H0, no matter the stopping rule, or even when the model was specified (e.g. Dienes, 
2016; Rouder & Haaf, 2020). 
  
Writing up 
For the APA guidelines on reporting Bayes factors gives three requirements, see Appelbaum 
et al. (2018, p. 20). The first requirement is to ”specify the models being compared”. Dienes (2014, 
2019) introduces the following conventions. Use BN(m, sd) to indicate H1 was modelled using a 
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Normal distribution  with mean m and standard deviation sd; BHN(0, sd)  to indicate H1 was modelled 
with a half-normal distribution with mode 0 and standard deviation sd; BC(m,s) to indicate H1 was 
modelled with a Cauchy with mode m and scale factor s; BHC(m,s) to indicate H1 was modelled with 
a half-Cauchy with mode m and scale factor s; and BU[min, max] to indicate H1 was modelled with a 
uniform distribution with minimum min and maximum max.  
One should also justify why one set the scale factors etc to the values one did. As the 
evidence depends on the tested predictions, the predictions must be relevant to one’s theory 
(Vanpaemel, 2016). Not all theories make the same predictions, so there can be no default Bayes 
factor to be used in all cases. Conversely, a purely subjective Bayes factor based on each person 
subjectively determining the predictions of each theory is not a satisfying basis to provide a 
scientific test of a theory. Instead predictions should follow from theories using auxiliaries that are 
either well tested or simple, and publicly available to criticism. 
 The next APA requirement is to “report the Bayes factors and how they were interpreted.” A 
decision may be made based on the Bayes factor, for example, a decision that a confound was 
controlled so the next study can move on from that issue; a decision that an intervention did not 
work so one theory will not be pursued further but another will be; a decision that an effect does 
exist so it is worth pursuing in a further study which tries to manipulate it. Decisions depend on not 
just the evidence for the alternatives (as represented in Bayes factors) but also the prior probabilities 
of the alternatives and the utilities of different outcomes. Given that the prior probabilities and 
utilities involved are vaguely defined, and assuming they do not vary much amongst alternatives 
(e.g. for different theories in cognitive psychology), it is often useful to keep them implicit and have 
a convention for what standard of evidence would motivate different decisions. In a context where 
significance has been set at 5% for decisions, the roughly equivalent amount of evidence would be a 
Bayes factor greater than 3 or less than 1/3. For example, one may conclude that two conditions 
produce the same outcome if the Bayes factor is less than a third, and thus decide that a confound 
has been dealt with. Such a standard of evidence has been criticized in some contexts (e.g. 
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Benjamin, Berger, Johannesson, Nosek, et al., 2018).  Pragmatically, one can see what the journal 
one is submitting to requires (e.g. 6 and 1/6 for Registered Reports at Cortex). (Where there is a 
genuine concern about very different prior probabilities amongst researchers, for example when 
dealing with parapsychology, and very different utilities for different decisions, for example in 
considering plausible severe side effects of an intervention, these can be explicitly taken into 
account in interpreting Bayes factors, Lindley, 2014). 
 The final APA requirement is to “test the sensitivity of the Bayes factors to assumptions 
about prior distributions [i.e. models of H1].” A convenient way of determining the robustness of 
one’s conclusions is with a Robustness Region (Dienes, 2019). Find all the scale factors that lead to 
the same conclusion.  For example if one’s preferred model of H1, using a half-normal distribution, 
led to the Bayes factor being above 3, the relevant threshold, then report all standard deviations for 
which the Bayes factor is above 3, as the interval [minimum, maximum]. This is illustrated below8. 
If the Robustness Region includes most standard deviations that are scientifically plausible, then the 
conclusion is robust. 
 For readers new to Bayes factors it is useful to explain how they work at the beginning of 
the Results section. Here is an example: “Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence 
(Wagenmakers, Verhagen, Ly,  Matzke, D. et al., 2017; see Dienes, 2015, and Sand & Nilsson, 
2016, for the relevance of Bayes factors for implicit cognition). A B of above 3 indicates 
“substantial” (Jeffreys, 1939) or, better, “moderate” (Lee & Wagnemakers, 2013) evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) over the null hypothesis (H0); thus by symmetry a B below 1/3 indicates 
substantial (/moderate) evidence for H0 over H1 (“substantial” in the sense of just worth taking note 
of.) Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate the data collected do not sensitively distinguish H0 from H1. 
Thus we will report that there was no effect when B < 1/3. Here, BHN(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in 
which the predictions of H1 were modelled as a half-normal distribution with an SD of x where x 
scales the size of effect that could be expected (see Dienes, 2014). Using the tonal inversion 
 
8 For relevant code see https://debruine.github.io/bfrr/ 
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paradigm, when testing on the same length as training, Jiang, Zhu, Guo, Ma, et al. (2012) found an 
effect of 7% above a control; Li, Jiang, Guo, Yang et al. (2013) found 6%, and Qiao, Sun, Li, Ling 
et al. (2018) found 6%. Thus, the rough size of effect expected if there is learning of different 
lengths by a mechanism that learnt the inversions per se is 6% above baseline. We modelled H1 as a 
half-normal with an SD of 6%. With these assumptions for modelling H1, as it happened, where an 
effect yielded a p value above .05, the Bayes factor was above 3, and vice versa (cf. Jeffreys, 1939, 
p. 359, for this rough but not guaranteed correspondence between B and p; if the obtained effect is 
roughly the size expected on a half-normal model of H1 the correspondence typically obtains, 
Dienes, 2014, but there is in general no guarantee of a correspondence between B and p values, 
which are not monotonically related, Lindley, 1957). We will interpret all effects with respect to the 
Bayes factors, while also reporting p values. 
 To indicate the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, for each B, a Robustness Region is 
reported, giving the range of scales that qualitatively support the same conclusion (i.e. evidence as 
supporting H0, or as supporting H1, or there not being much evidence at all), notated as: RRB>3 [x1, 
x2] where x1 is the smallest SD that gives the same conclusion and x2 is the largest; or RRB<1/3 [x1, 
x2]; or RR1/3<B<3 [x1, x2].” 
 Here is an example of reporting the results themselves: “The unequal length group 
performed at above chance levels, 55% (SE = 1.8%), t(30) = 2.78, p = .0094, BH(0, 6%) = 19.72, 
RRB>3[0.8, >50%], as did the equal length group, 57% (SE = 2.5%), t(30) = 2.80, p = .0088, BH(0, 
6%) =  21.61, RRB>3[1.1, >50%]. There was no evidence one way or the other whether the two 
groups differed, Mdiff = 2%, SE = 3.1, t(60) = 0.65, p = .52,  BH(0, 6%) = 0.78, RRB>3[0, 18%]. There 
was evidence that the control group performed at chance, 49% (SE = 1.5%), t(30) = 0.67, p = .51, 
BH(0, 6%) = 0.16, RRB>3[2.6, >50%].)”  It reads much as a standard results section, and a significance 
tester could agree with the conclusions  - yet distinctions are made unavailable to the significance 
tester: There can be evidence for no effect, or not much evidence either way for an effect. The 
distinction has consequences for the discussion. In the discussion the prediction that the different 
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length and same length groups would perform the same would not be counted as either confirmed or 
disconfirmed. Conversely, the claim that the control group performed at chance could be made, and 
the theoretical implications of this discussed. 
 
Discussion 
 Bayesian hypothesis testing is especially useful when answering the existential question of 
whether or not something exists, or determining the plausibility or degree of evidence for something 
existing. There are two methods for answering this question. Either the researcher determines what 
a minimally interesting effect is (and then considers how much of the posterior distribution falls in 
the null interval); or else one considers the full range of possible effects predicted by the theory 
(and calculates a Bayes factor). The choice of method depends on what aspect of the prediction of 
the theory is most salient and easy to motivate objectively. If what is most crucial is the minimal 
interesting effect size (m), and especially if the range of effect sizes predicted is hard to otherwise 
specify, then inference can be with respect to the null interval the minimal effect size defines ([-m, 
+m]). If the minimally interesting effect size is hard to determine and it is anyway very small 
compared to a readily predicted effect size, then inference is most convenient using Bayes factors 
testing against a point H0.  What one cannot do is determine if a point “no effect” is outside or 
inside the credibility interval in order to make an existential claim. 
 Bayes factors and inference with respect to intervals are not guaranteed to come to 
apparently the same conclusion (they ask different questions). The Bayes factor uses the full range 
of predictions of the theory with respect to the effect tested; inference by intervals focuses on just 
one aspect of that prediction, the minimally interesting effect size. (Bayes factors can incorporate 
the latter, but they will give a very similar answer when testing against a null interval H0 as a point 
H0 so long as the null interval is small compared to the standard error.) One can for example, have 
evidence for no effect (with a Bayes factor) even though a range of possibly interesting effects 
remain plausible (the CI extends above the null interval) (See Palfi & Dienes, 2019b for an 
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example). This arises when the theory predicts that large effects – that is, an extensive range of 
effect sizes above the null interval - are plausible. A couple of examples will illustrate how 
predicting a range of possibilities can entail evidence against the theory even though not all 
theoretically relevant possibilities have been ruled out. Imagine you left your keys in either the 
bedroom or the kitchen. There are 10 places in the bedroom they could be. You have searched eight 
and they were not there. Whatever your prior confidence that the keys were in the bedroom rather 
than the kitchen, those odds should now be reduced – even though the keys still could be in the 
bedroom. Similarly, supersymmetry in physics predicts particles that could have a range of masses. 
That whole range has not been explored; but much of it has without finding supersymmetric 
particles. Because of this, some physicists have reported a dramatic reduction in confidence in the 
theory (Jha, 2013). 
 Making existential claims depends on having a theory of how big the thing is one is looking 
for. With no such theory, one cannot obtain evidence for something not existing. In that case, one 
could just estimate. Similarly one could just estimate if existence was certain and the only question 
of interest was how big it was. For example, in developing a new variant of an already reliable 
scale, finding the reliability of the new scale, or its correlation with the old one, may be a matter of 
how big the correlations are; establishing the mere existence of the correlations may be pointless. In 
that case, 95% Cis may be all that is needed (e.g. Palfi, Moga, Lush, Scott, et al., 2019). If one only 
estimates, be careful not to make existential claims (thereby acting as if such claims had been 
established by the reported statistics). Do not say the regression slope is different from zero, say it is 
probably between 0.5 and 0.8 ratings units/rating unit. If the posterior distribution is centred close to 
zero, do not say there is evidence for the slope being zero; say that the slope probably lies between 
the limits of the CI. 
  A continuous posterior distribution on a difference presumes that difference definitely exists. 
One may presume existence of the difference and wish to know if the difference is positive or 
negative. Thus, in estimating a difference one may conclude that the difference is probably positive 
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if, for example, 95% of the posterior lies above zero. In this case, no minimally interesting effect 
size nor scale of effect need be specified. 
 The examples given in the paper have been concerning whether a population parameter is 
zero, or one side of zero. However, it is one thing for a proportion of individuals to have a 
population effect one way, and a proportion of individuals a population effect the other way or a 
zero effect; and another thing for everyone to show an effect in the same direction (Haaf & Rouder, 
2019). The same issue of determining relevant effect sizes arises in modelling this situation. What is 
the relevant effect size may then vary across individuals; for example, in determining the extent of 
metacognition according to meta-d’, each individual’s first order d’ can be used to fix the predicted 
meta-d’ for that individual (for an example see Leganes Fonteneau, Scott, & Duka, 2018). 
 Aczel, Hoekstra,  Gelman, Wagenmakers, et al. (2020) considered the approaches of 
different Bayesian experts and concluded that the main point they had in common was that analyses 
should avoid ritual, and should engage with problems thoughtfully. An example of that principle in 
this article is advising thoughtful engagement with what size effect a theory predicts. Most of the 
experts surveyed in Aczel et al. did not like thresholds of evidence, on the grounds that Bayes 
factors are continuous indicators of evidence. Why do we need conventions for good enough 
evidence? One could avoid all arbitrary conventions, for evidence or anything else, and let people 
make their own minds up from data. The limit of this argument is for the results and discussion 
section to consist of the following sentence: “Here are the raw data: make of them what you will!” 
We should not be dichotophobic (the irrational phobia of making discriminations when 
discriminations are called for). At some point someone has to make something of the data. How 
shall they do it?  When we decide to stop gathering evidence against one confound and move on to 
other issues, a decision is necessarily made about how much evidence is good enough. We just have 
to bear in mind that every statistical model, every statistical decision is provisional: At a later point, 
better reasons may emerge for a different minimally interesting effect size, or for a different model 
of H1, or for a confound in the design to seem more plausible, and the inferences motivated by the 
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data thereby change. Our statistical modelling and inferences are conjectural. But provisional 
conventions help us move on. (Compare Popper’s 1963 argument for his measure of the degree of 
corroboration for a theory shown by some data being provisional.) 
 The approaches described in this article can be applied to the output of many different ways 
of modelling the data. Model the data as seems best. Once we have a parameter and its standard 
error, either inference by intervals or Bayes factors can be applied in order test hypotheses about 
that parameter. (And thereby test models and theories piece-meal, Mayo, 2018.) No new statistical 
packages need be learned. One need not be a “Bayesian” to benefit from the approaches described 
here. One need only care about whether one has good reasons for answering the existential question 
of whether something exists.  
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